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The Metaphysics of Self in Praśastapāda’s Differential Naturalism1 
Shalini Sinha 
University of Reading 
 
Abstract and Keywords 
In A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) the classical 
Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda  (6th c. CE) presents an innovative metaphysics of the self.  This 
article examines the defining metaphysical and axiological features of this conception of self and 
the dualist categorial schema in which it is located.  It shows how this idea of the self, as a reflexive 
and ethical being, grounds a multinaturalist view of natural order and offers a conception of agency 
that claims to account for all the reflexive features of human mental and bodily life.  Finally, it 
discusses the ends of self’s reflexivity and of human life as a return to the true self.  It argues that at 
the heart of Praśastapāda’s metaphysics of self is the idea that ethics is metaphysics, and that 
epistemic practice is ethical practice. 
 
Keywords: self, agency, dualism, realism, dharma, values, nature, Vaiśeṣika, Praśastapāda, 
Śrīdhara, Udayana 
   
Introduction 
The Padārthadharmasaṃgraha (A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories) is a seminal 
sixth century work of the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (circa 530 CE).   A 
contemporary of the Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga (early 6th c. CE), Praśastapāda is the key 
figure in the development of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.  The Compendium, his sole work, is one of the 
most distinguished contributions to Indian metaphysics and a major classical Indian text on the self.  
The significance of the Compendium in the development of Indian metaphysics is difficult to 
exaggerate.  It is foundational for all subsequent developments in Vaiśeṣika metaphysics and the 
later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, and remains the key text against which even the most revisionary 
and reformist metaphysicians of this tradition define themselves well into the early modern period 
(circa 17th c. CE).2  The philosophy of self and mind, conceptions of mereological holism, and 
material atomism presented in the Compendium anchor subsequent Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika critiques of 
Buddhist metaphysics and philosophy of mind, as well as those of competing Brahmanical schools 
such as Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya.3  
 
The Compendium is also known as The Commentary of Praśastapāda (Praśastapādabhāṣya), on 
the Vaiśeṣika -sūtra of Kaṇāda (circa 1st c. CE), the earliest extant Vaiśeṣika text.  Although based 
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on the Sūtra, the Compendium’s integration of its somewhat loosely organized contents in a 
revisionist and systematic categorial analysis considerably supersedes the characteristics of a 
commentary to make it one of the most important contributions to Indian metaphysics.  I dub the 
metaphysical paradigm presented in the Compendium differential (vaiśeṣika) naturalism.  This 
owes in part to its fine-grained analysis and classification of the constituents of the world, by way 
of their similarities and differences,4 but also to its unique concept of a differentiator (viśeṣa), a 
primitive category that distinguishes elementary objects of the same class, such as earth or water 
atoms for instance.5  For the purposes of this essay, interpretations of the Compendium rely on two 
major commentaries on it from the classical period, Śrīdhara’s Shoots of Reason (Nyāyakandalī, 
10th cent. C.E.) and Udayana’s Row of Lightbeams (Kiraṇāvalī), as well as his Investigation of the 
Reality of the Self (Ātmatattvaviveka), from the late 10th/early 11th c. C.E.; and an early modern 
commentary, Jagadīśa’s Sūkti (fl. 1600–1620) which is possibly the most succinct interpretation of 
the metaphysics of self presented in the Compendium.   
 
Although the analytical rigour and robustness of the Compendium is exemplary, what sets it apart is 
its philosophical integrity.  This refers to its integration of ontological, ethical, and epistemic 
concepts in a unified conception of embodied existence in a world that includes both nonphysical 
selves and matter, reason and values.  The following discussion attempts to unpack the key features 
of this integrative and axiological metaphysics and epistemology of the self (ātman) with a view to 
their philosophical scope and implications. The first section discusses the key features of 
Praśastapāda’s metaphysical paradigm, the mitigated dualism of its ontological and causal 
architecture, and how this locates self and moral values in the material world.  The following 
section examines the idea of self presented in the Compendium and the conceptions of life and 
natural order this offers by way of a conception of ethics as metaphysics. The intrinsic reflexivity 
and axiology of the embodied self is discussed next and how this accounts for the phenomena of 
human life from its first-personal features all the way down to biological processes. The 
penultimate section considers the possibilities of self-transformation that self’s value-laden 
reflexivity advocates as its own end through a conception of epistemic practice as ethical practice; it 
is followed by a concluding discussion. 
 
Classical Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics 
The Compendium claims that a six-fold categorial schema of metaphysical kinds accounts for all 
that exists, namely, substance (dravya), property (guṇa), motion (karman), inherence (samavāya), 
differentiator (viśeṣa), and universal (sāmānya).  Substances are the foundation of this system.  
They serve as the existential basis in which properties and motion instantiate, and the loci in which 
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causal relationships between substances, properties, and motion, the relata of causation, take place –	
the latter notion dates back to Kaṇāda.  The ontological relation of inherence or being-in enables the 
existence of properties and motion in a substance, whereas the unique Vaiśeṣika category of 
ontological differentiator or individuator distinguishes otherwise identical elementary substances 
such as earth or water atoms. The last category, universal, groups tokens of the same property or 
substance type, such as redness or cowness, in distinct classes.6 
 
An Axiological Realism 
Classical Vaiśeṣika holds that a world of mind-independent objects exists.  This is, however, an 
epistemically, semantically, and axiologically constrained realism and it reflects the centrality of 
rational and moral agency in Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.  “All six categories (padārtha)”, Praśastapāda 
asserts, “possess reality, (astitva), cognizability (jñeyatva) and nameability (abhidheyatva).”7  This 
says that a mind-independent world of particulars exists which is cognitively accessible in terms of 
distinct sorts of categories or kinds, and is linguistically expressible in the semantic structures of 
natural language.  This is a comprehensive epistemic and semantic realism which claims that the 
categories that are constitutive of the world encompass all that exists, a version of realism that is 
quite unlike contemporary realist paradigms.8   
The first three categories of objects, substances, properties, and motion, also possess certain 
axiological features.  They are called artha, which means, alternately, object, purpose, or meaning, 
most plausibly, because they are considered the relata of causation.  Material objects are considered 
here in terms of the rational and moral concerns of agents, as sources of value, meaning, and 
purpose (artha), illustrated by Praśastapāda’s claim that objects are the “cause of virtuous (dharma) 
and non-virtuous (adharma) states [of the self]”,9 a notion that again goes back to the Vaiśeṣika-
sūtra.10  Śrīdhara elucidates this by saying that all objects (artha) “have an inherent capacity in 
themselves of producing virtue and non-virtue”.11  Objects are here sources of value and meaning 
(artha) for selves qua agents and come to be incorporated in intentional actions in ways that are 
“virtuous (dharma) and non-virtuous (adharma)”.12  
The intent of these epistemic, semantic, and axiological constraints on Vaiśeṣika realism is perhaps 
best understood in terms of a succint claim made by Śrīdhara: “[It is self] for whose purpose are all 
the things [in the world]”.13 Śrīdhara’s reference here is to the world of objects that is for embodied 
selves as experiencing subjects (jñātṛ) and agents (kartṛ), a world to which conscious agents stand 
in various evaluative, affective, volitional, and ethical modes.  It is thus from the standpoint of the 
agentive self that objects are cognitively accessible and semantically expressible here, and bearers 
of ethical and affective values, rather than the “dead”	material things of scientific naturalism.14  The 
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following two sections examine the ontological and constructivist sources of this version of realism.  
The ontological architecture of Vaiśeṣika realism is set out first, followed by a discussion of how 
this shapes a world of embodied existence that is constitutively ethical and value-laden. 
 
Self, Mind, and Matter in a Mitigated Dualism 
The axiological thrust of Vaiśeṣika realism is embedded in a substance dualism that differs 
significantly from more radical dualisms such as Jainism, among Indian traditions, as well as 
Cartesianism, and is perhaps more akin to contemporary non-Cartesian dualisms such as E. J. 
Lowe’s emergent substance dualism.15 Three features limit classical Vaiśeṣika dualism: (i) the 
metaphysical commonalities that underwrite mental and physical substances qua substance and 
assure a degree of commensurability between them; (ii) an ontological architecture that includes 
intermediate substances that are the enabling conditions of mental and physical causation and, 
ostensibly, mitigate the mental-physical divide; (iii) relations of necessary causal dependence of the 
characteristic mental and ethical properties of the self on its body16 and, conversely, the dependence 
of a distinct sphere of physical causation, and the possibility of organic life, on the nonphysical self.  
Let us discuss these features in turn. 
 
The categorial schema of the Compendium distinguishes a set of nine substances (dravya): atomic 
matter (bhūta), consisting of the elements earth, water, fire, and air; the non-atomic material 
element ether; the dimensional substances temporality (kāla) and spatiality (dik); the nonphysical 
self (ātman), and self’s inner instrument (antaḥkaraṇa), the non-conscious mind (manas).  In 
contrast to radical dualisms, such as Cartesianism, a sharp substance and property dualism is 
excluded here by the generic (sāmānya) properties and overlapping features of mental and physical 
substances.  All substances, including nonphysical selves and matter, share certain generic 
properties (guṇa) qua substance, namely, spatial extension (parimāṇa), temporality (kāla), causal 
conjunction (saṃyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga), countability (saṃkhyā), and separateness 
(pṛthaktva).17  This means that, pace Descartes, nonphysical and physical substances share certain 
essential metaphysical features such as spatial extension and the possibility of causal connection.  
They are, in other words, metaphysically commensurate, or equivalent,18 in ways that make them 
similar kinds of things, and possibly mitigate the problem of causal commensurability and causal 
interaction between mental and physical substances faced by Cartesian and other radical dualisms.19  
As Matilal observes, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other Indian philosophies “the ‘mental’	and the 
‘physical’ may not constitute …	two strange categories so very different from each other that causal 
explanation would be relevant to the latter and not the former.”	 Further, “[t]he idea that mental and 
physical events are basically and irreducibly different is somewhat foreign to the Indian …	[S]uch 
 5	
talk of ‘interaction’	[between mental and physical phenomena] must be regarded as a reference to 
simple causation among similar sorts of items.”20 
 
The dualism of classical Vaiśeṣika is further mitigated by the fact that mental and physical 
substances exhibit overlapping physical and mental features in ways that confound a clear mental-
physical divide.  Thus, ordinary matter (bhūta), such as the substances earth, fire, water, and air, is 
typically atomic.  Yet the atomic particle that mediates self-body causation, the non-conscious mind 
(manas), is considered non-material (abhūta).  At the same time, in virtue of being spatially 
bounded (mūrta), it is excluded from being a potentially conscious, mental substance, a self.  It 
does, however, serve as an unconscious processor of information from both the senses and from 
self’s conscious and unconscious mental states, a function which is characteristically considered 
mental.  Among material substances, ether (ākāśa) has the feature of spatial ubiquity (vibhu), a 
feature that is characteristic of the nonphysical substance, the self.  Similarly, the dimensional 
substances, spatiality and temporality, like the self, are ubiquitous, yet they are identified as neither 
mental nor material but as merely the condition of possibility of physical causation.21   
 
The demarcation of material and mental substances here leaves the atomic mind and the 
dimensional substances outside the mental-material divide.  What is striking about these substances 
is their significance as enabling conditions of mental and physical causation.  These substances lack 
an independent ontology, i.e. they lack characteristic (viśeṣa) properties of their own, and are 
bearers of only those generic properties of a substance and certain general material properties that 
facilitate their role in causation.22  In contrast, matter and selves, the relata of causation, are 
distinguished by characteristic properties that constitute the similar and dissimilar features of the 
objective world.   
 
The inclusion of mind and the dimensional substances as ontological connectors23 in mental and 
physical causation further attenuates Vaiśeṣika dualism and distinguishes it from its Cartesian 
counterpart.24  As a non-material yet non-mental substance, the atomic mind is a necessary 
ontological link that bridges the gap between the nonphysical self and its material body.  In virtue 
of being atomic, and yet lacking characteristic properties, mind serves merely as an instrument of 
causal connection between the spatially ubiquitous self and its sensory-bodily complex.  It functions 
as a kind of subpersonal processor that transmits information and signals between self and its body 
and self and its mental states, in a sequential and co-ordinated manner that facilitates mental-
physical and mental-mental causation.25 
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A third factor that alleviates Vaiśeṣika dualism, and sharply distinguishes it from Cartesianism, is 
the metaphysical dependence of mental states on the living body (śarīra).  The body, Praśastapāda 
asserts, is a necessary causal basis (ādhāra) of consciousness and mental life.26  Only the embodied 
self can therefore be a bearer of consciousness and other mental properties.  The liberated self, the 
end to be achieved in human life for Vaiśeṣika, is disembodied and, therefore, unminded.  
Consciousness and other mental properties are, therefore, not essential properties of the self, and 
self is not essentially a mental substance.27 It is one of the most distinctive features of the Vaiśeṣika 
self that it is only potentially a mental substance, and its characteristic mental and ethical properties 
are non-essential.  In contrast, material properties are essential properties.28 The significance and 
implications of this core distinction between self and matter, and mental and material properties, 
has its source, it is argued next, in the idea of self as a reflexive being, a being that is a value in and 
for itself. 
 
Reflexivity, Value, and the Self in a Compositionist Metaphysics  
 Praśastapāda characterizes the self in the following way: “Its [i.e., self’s] qualities are, cognition 
(jñāna), pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), will (prayatna), [the 
states of] virtue (dharma), non-virtue (adharma),29 cognitive imprints (saṃskāra),30	…”.31  These 
characteristic properties of the self distinguish it from all other substances.  Now the common 
metaphysical feature these properties share, I argue, is their reflexivity.  Reflexivity here simply 
means that which is directed back onto itself and can act or operate on itself.  We might say that 
reflexivity is the ‘mark’ of the mental, and the living, in classical Vaiśeṣika: it marks those 
phenomena of embodied mental and bodily life that are self-attributing or self-regarding, in some 
way, because they are necessarily of or for someone.32 
 
The defining feature of selfhood, what makes something a self, in this view, is the reflexivity of that 
substance or being.  The reflexivity of self, however, is a relational and contextual feature of its 
embodiment, i.e. self is directed back onto itself, and acts or operates on itself, only through its 
relationships with the world of objects it is embodied in - a claim which is consistent with the 
metaphysical dependence of self’s mental properties on its embodied existence. The range of 
reflexive powers attributed to the self is distinguishable into two distinct types of agency, the first, 
personal and individual, the second, impersonal and ‘natural’.  This section discusses the 
impersonal agency of the self.  A discussion of personal agency is left to the following sections.   
 
Self’s intrinsic reflexivity in the Compendium is intimately bound to its axiological status as a 
primitive value that is in and for itself.  The self, Praśastapāda asserts, is itself the highest value; it 
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is the good (niḥśreyasa) to be achieved as the aim of human life,33 a sentiment first expressed in the 
Vaiśeṣika-sūtra.34  The relational reflexivity of the self, however, means that it is a value for itself 
through its relationships with the objective world.  Moreover, the embodied self is constitutively a 
ethical being because embodied existence in Vaiśeṣika is a psychophysical composition shaped by 
self’s impersonal ethical-compositional power (adṛṣṭa). 
 
 Self’s compositional powers (adṛṣṭa) are natural causal powers that are synonymous with the 
powers of the states of virtue (dharma) and non-virtue (adharma) of the self that explicate ethical 
law (dharma).  The states of virtue and non-virtue are measures of value, for which reason, they are 
often translated as merit and demerit.  They register the moral value of a self’s intentional actions in 
its former embodiments and, in accordance with these, act directly on matter to constitute a world 
of psychophysical objects: an ethical distribution (vyavasthā) of embodied selves that is appropriate 
to the goodness, or moral genealogy, of each self’s past lives and actions.  Praśastapāda explains 
this in the following way: “[T]he virtuous (dharma) and non-virtuous (adharma) actions of beings 
act on [material] atoms to form bodies as a means of experiencing pain and pleasure that is 
consistent with the quality of their past actions	…”.   Śrīdhara adds: “The [living] body is the 
receptacle of the experiences of the conscious agent…”;35 while Udayana suggests that it is 
fabricated as a mechanism (yantra) that enables a self to experience the pleasures and pains 
consistent with the moral quality of its past actions.36 
 
The underlying thought here seems to be that only a reflexive being, a self, can be a measure of 
value and ethical law, as the good itself, and hold the possibility of organizing natural difference 
and order.  The measures of moral value, qua the ethical-compositional powers of the self, 
exemplify a kind of ethical reason that is ‘natural’ reason, present in the very constitution of the 
world.  The intuition here, found in much of Indian philosophy, is that there is ‘reason’ and ‘values’ 
in nature, of an impersonal sort, that is bound to reason and values in the human realm in some way.   
It is in virtue of this ethical reason and agency that living organisms come to inhabit subjective and 
affective worlds that are defined by particular sensory and cognitive capacities and a bodily 
apparatus that are moral constructs infused with appropriate values and possibilities.  A world of 
different physicalities is thus created in which the cognitive, affective, and volitional life of beings, 
human and animal,37 is embedded. This is a multiplicity of psychophysical worlds and existences, 
appropriate to each self as its very own, that is unified in the impersonal axiomatic framework of 
ethical-compositional law (adṛṣṭa), the values and norms of which are never fully spelt out, even 
though they have an ontological reality.  
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In this view, the very possibility of being, and of coming to be, is the accrued power of goodness, 
the measures of value of which are self’s states of virtue and non-virtue.  A living being is here an 
entity that brings about a world and comes into this world as its own good, the assumption being 
that living being is goodness itself, or a measure of it, because it is the embodiment of a self-
substance that is intrinsically the good (niḥśreyasa) itself.  Nature or natural being, if we mean by 
this the material and mental world we inhabit, comes to be an ethical composition, an articulation of 
moral reason and values, via the compositional agency of adṛṣṭa that constitutes and integrates the 
ordinary world of composite middle-sized objects.  The natural world is here founded on 
particularities and valences of the good that reflect the values and concerns that shape the thought 
and action of individual self-substances.38  It is the power of being of the good itself that is the 
foundation of the natural world and integrates different sorts of regularities, both the rational sphere 
of human mental and bodily life, and the sphere of physical causal order, by way of its 
compositional agential powers (adṛṣṭa).39  The former corresponds to the reflexive, rational sphere 
of agency, the latter to the instrumental and mechanical sphere of instrumentality.  Each sphere is 
here defined, distinguished, and regulated according to its distinct mental and physical ontological 
components, and their characteristic properties, by the values and norms of the impersonal agency 
and compositional power of adṛṣṭa which spans and integrates these spheres.  
 
In this conception of self and world, ethics is metaphysics, or certainly underwrites it.40 At its heart 
is the assumption that the foundations of law, order, and the good are inseparable in a way that is 
constitutive of each.  This assumption is voiced more clearly in the idea that being and truth, and 
the good itself, are inalienably bound together, a confluence of metaphysics, epistemology, and 
ethics that rests on a fundamental equivocation between the notions of reality, or being (sat), and 
truth (satya) that permeates Indian philosophical thought - Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Jaina.  This 
claims that reality, or the true nature of things, is truth and this has moral value qua the highest 
good to be achieved in human life.  In Vaiśeṣika, this takes the form that the substance itself of 
human life qua self-substance is a foundational value that informs, through its range of properties 
and powers, a value-infused ontology of embodied existence in which natural order is an ethical 
order.41 
 
The natural world, in this account, is an ethically integrated universe bound by values, a world 
whose standpoint is one of agential engagement rather than scientific detachment.  Human, animal, 
and physical nature, and the objects of the natural world, do not come here already made as 
complex continua of deterministic processes; rather, the multiplicity of differentiated natures, 
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mental and physical, human and non-human, that constitute the world are composed and 
recomposed as a differentiated order of things that explicate, and are bound together by, moral 
values and ethical concerns.  The material world is not, then, an impersonal world of things but a 
world of objects (artha) that explicates particular values in each individual context of embodiment, 
where these values constrain and make demands on human, and other, agents as a particular 
ensemble of possibilities that each self can refer back to as its very own.  
 
The notion of nature adumbrated above coheres with a broader notion of nature as own-nature or 
own-being (svabhāva) in Indian philosophy whose materialist correlate, svabhāvavāda, is often 
translated as naturalism.42  In an interesting analysis, Bhattacharya, via Joseph Needham, suggests 
that “own-being”	may stand for natural order, or causality, in some accounts, and may be linked to 
the Vedic conception of a dynamic order that is the active realization of truth (ṛta) which, together 
with its later guise of dharma or ethical-compositional law, is the antecedent of Praśastapāda’s 
conception of natural order as an ethical order.43   
 
We see above that the Vaiśeṣika conception of the natural world, or the natural order of things, 
evokes the idea of the integrity and integration of multiple natures.  We might dub this conception 
of natural order multinaturalism to borrow Viveiros de Castro’s term if not its entire meaning.44  As 
opposed to scientific or strict naturalistic conceptions of nature as an order of dead things, this is a 
world of differentiated natures that are held together by an integrative schema of values and norms 
across the human, animal, and material spheres.  Whether or not we concede such a view, it does 
point to a primitive idea of what may be considered nature or naturalism in Indian traditions that 
does not simply rest on the claims of matter and its local laws and regularities, nor entirely 
correspond to liberal naturalisms such as those of McDowell or Strawson.45  Rather than a 
conception of nature and naturalism in Indian traditions as simply matter-based (bhūta) or 
materialistic (bhūtavāda),46 this points to notions of nature and natural order that are more closely 
aligned to the idea of a dynamic order that is constitutively value-based, admitting a wider 
impersonal ontological reality of values, norms, and ethical-compositional agency.47 
 
Agency, Instrumentality, and Causal Order 
The compositional powers of the self underwrite and integrate two distinct spheres of local activity, 
the sphere of the embodied self and agency, and the sphere of material objects and instrumentality.  
It is the very nature of a self, Praśastapāda claims, that it is an agent, i.e. a conscious reflexive being 
that exhibits reasons, values, and self-interest that refer to its own good.48  Material objects, on the 
other hand, are non-conscious, irreflexive substances that are incapable of self-regard and, as such, 
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wholly subject to instrumental use by another.49  Śrīdhara explains the distinction between agency 
and instrumentality in the following way: “There can also be no compatibility between the 
characters of an agent and an instrument because the character of an agent consists in not being 
urged by some thing else, while that of an instrument consists in being employed by others [in 
actions] –	and thus one is positive while the other [is] negative; and as such the two are wholly 
incompatible with each other...”50  The possibility of agency rests foremost  “…	[in] the action of 
cognition …	[in which] self is independent [of all other things]”, and so “has the character of being 
an agent …”51  Jagadīśa elucidates these features of conscious agency further by saying that it is 
characteristic of selves that they exhibit movements that are self-regarding, such as, striving to 
acquire objects that are considered beneficial and avoiding those considered harmful.  Material 
phenomena such as the movement of wind, on the other hand, do not exhibit this capacity for 
acquiring that which is favourable and averting that which is unfavourable for oneself.52 
 
An agent then is a rational kind that exhibits the capacity to act for itself and on itself in ways that 
are not wholly subject to external causal powers.  Material substances such as the body, however, 
are instrumental kinds that are wholly subject to external causal powers.  They cannot, therefore, be 
agents.53 	Śrīdhara remarks that material phenomena, as instrumental kinds, exhibit regularities 
whose impersonal structures follow an impact-model of causation and demonstrate natural systemic 
regularities and random contingencies that are externally imposed.54  In contrast, personal agency 
exhibits self-regarding, rational regularities.  Agency cannot, therefore, be attributed to material 
objects such as the body or its parts.55  
 
An agent, our philosophers agree, is a being who stands in an evaluative relationship to itself, 
something that is possible only for a reflexive being that is a value in and for itself.  The 
irreflexivity of matter, however, means that it lacks the possibility of being a value for itself, and of 
acting or operating to change or to regulate itself in any way.  Material properties in being subject to 
change and regulation by external causes cannot, therefore, be eliminated except by the destruction 
of the substance they are instantiated in.  For this reason, only a nonphysical substance can holds 
reflexive possibilities of self-determination and self-transformation that can culminate in liberation, 
i.e. in the divesting by self of its mental and ethical properties and its bodily accoutrement.  
 
The Scope of Agency 
Agency, Praśastapāda asserts, is the mark of a self, and an agent (kartṛ), as shown below, is a being 
who stands in a reflexive attitude to itself at all levels of its mental and bodily life.56  Self qua agent 
is the locus of the rational structures of personal agency, namely, cognition, desire, aversion, 
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pleasure, pain, volitional impulse, and memory, and the impersonal agency of the states of virtue 
and non-virtue, discussed earlier.  These powers of the self are held to account for a range of 
phenomena that demonstrate some degree of self-attribution or self-application and include: (i) the 
first-personal phenomena of selfhood, in particular, the experience, or sense, of self-identity as an I-
ness (ahaṃ, ahaṃatā) or a mine-ness (mama, mamatā); (ii) the ownership of mental states but also 
of the body as uniquely my own (sva); (iii) the rational structures of intentional action and the 
primitive rationality exhibited by the subintentional activities, and the subpersonal and biological 
processes, of the human body; and (iv) synchronic and diachronic mental and bodily unity and 
identity.  These features are briefly discussed in turn. 
 
Our ordinary conception of the self is largely phenomenal and psychological and centers on the 
first-personal presentations of reflexivity a self exhibits.  A self is ordinarily thought to be that 
which distinguishes me, myself, reflexively and uniquely from others in a variety of ways.  In 
particular, by way of the first-personal presentations of selfhood, the sense of I-ness or mine-ness 
that identifies me subjectively and informs my psychological life as my own.57  Śrīdhara and 
Udayana explore the first personal phenomena of selfhood associated with intentional 
consciousness (caitanya), or cognition (jñāna), further.  Self, they claim, explicates modes of self-
identity, a sense of being my own (sva) or myself, from the inside so to speak, which distinguishes 
me from others.  It denotes that which presents the nature of being one’s own (sva), says	Śridhara.58 
Udayana explains selfhood as the experience of being non-different from oneself (sva).59 
 
The first-personal phenomena of selfhood in classical Vaiśeṣika are features of the agentive activity 
of cognition.  Cognition is the core characteristic of the self, Praśastapāda claims,60 and like all 
activities of the self, cognition is agentive as receptive attention to an object61 or striving to perceive 
an object.62  It is the necessary causal connection of mind with the self in the activity of cognizing 
that yields introspective (antarmukha) experience of the self as the I-object (ahaṃkāra),63 an 
experience of self as an agent of its cognitive acts and an owner (svāmī) of its mental states.  The 
source of this, Śrīdhara and Udayana point out, is that we experience our volitional impulses in the 
act of cognizing as the cause of cognizings and of the conscious effects of these cognizings, because 
both volitional impulses and their cognitive effects arise successively in the same substratum.64  
That is,we experience ourselves as agents and owners of our cognitions.  Mental states, i.e. 
conscious experience of affections and volitions as objects of cognition, can thus be reflexively 
attributed to oneself, and owned as I or mine, in virtue of their instantiation in a self that is 
identified as I.65  In a similar way, it is by causal connection with the body and bodily activity, that 
self can identify with, and appropriate, the body as uniquely its own so that this body is identified as 
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my body and not that of another, Śrīdhara claims.66 
 
It is the structures of rational agency, however, that exemplify most clearly the presence of a self 
according to the Compendium.  The capacity (yogyatā) for engaging in rational, desire-motivated 
activity of the type ‘striving’	(ceṣṭā)67 is evident, it suggests, not only in conscious and deliberative 
actions but all the way down in the primitive, unconscious, and subpersonal activities and processes 
of human mental and bodily li  The rational structure of intentional action is explicated in the 
following way: judgements (jñāna)  about whether an object is a source of pleasure (sukḥa) or pain 
(duḥkha), and so favourable (hita) or unfavourable (ahita) for oneself, induces desire (icchā) or 
aversion (dveṣa) towards it.  Desire and aversion, in turn, motivate volitional impulses (prayatna) 
that are executed by the mind, self’s inner instrument of execution and attention (manas), as mental 
and bodily activity (pravṛtti) and restraint (nivṛtti).  Actions of the type activity seek to acquire 
objects that are considered favourable as a means of gaining pleasure (sukha); actions of the type 
restraint shun objects that are considered harmful to avoid pain (duḥkha).68  Praśastapāda explains: 
“Just as a charioteer is inferred by the motion of the chariot, so a willful controller (prayatnavan 
adhiṣṭhātṛ) [of the living body] is inferred by such activity (pravṛtti) as is fit for obtaining what is 
advantageous (hita) and such restraint (nivṛtti) as is fit for avoiding what is disadvantageous (ahita), 
both being located in the body (vigraha).69 
 
Examples of more archaic modes of agency that mark the presence of a self include subintentional 
and instinctual activities such as breathing and blinking: “[The self is also inferred] from such 
processes as breathing in and breathing out.  How so?  From observing the changing (vikṛta) 
movement of the air contained in the body, [we infer a willful controller who is] like one who 
pumps the bellows.  On account of the regular activity of opening and shutting the eyes, [we infer a 
controller who is] like a puppeteer [directing] a wooden puppet”.70  Similarly, sneezing in a dusty 
environment to avoid harm,71 the subpersonal processes that maintain bodily equilibrium and 
prevent the body from falling down,72 and the biological processes of growth, healing, and repair of 
the human body mark the existence of a self: “From the growth of the body, the healing of its 
wounds and fractures, etc., [we infer a controller] like a house-owner [who extends and repairs his 
house].”73 The idea here is that living systems exhibit unconscious or subconscious self-interest by 
way of the reflexes and responses they demonstrate in responses to stimuli and circumstances 
because these responses are self-regarding, even if in a primitive way.   The thought here is that the 
preservation of life, its maintenance and continuance is itself a value, because it is the good of self 
itself, which is exemplified in the subpersonal and biological processes of the human organism that 
acts to maintain the well-being and integrity of the body.74  
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Self, as a reflexive unifier, also accounts for the cross-modal unity of sensory deliverances,75 and 
the unity of agency.  Praśastapāda exemplifies the latter in the following way: “…after perceiving a 
visual object, we observe modifications in the faculty of taste following the recollection of the taste 
[of that object]; [from this], a single [unifier] is recognized, who is the perceiver of both [faculties, 
vision and taste], like a spectator situated behind two round windows [of a house]”.76  Self accounts 
then for a continuum of relational and reflexive phenomena that exhibit self-reference, self-interest, 
or self-attribution in primitive and simple or complex ways, from the subjective and psychological 
forms that are associated with the first-person perspective, to deliberative forms of personal agency, 
and the self-maintenance and self-continuity of the human organism –	and other living systems.   
  
Reflexivity and Epistemic Practice 
Human selves in classical Vaiśeṣika are conscious, reflexive beings who stand in an evaluative 
relationship to themselves and so hold the possibility of self-knowledge (ātma-jñāna).77  Self-
knowledge is here synonymous with self-experience and refers to direct experience of self’s true 
nature (svarūpa) as substance and the highest good (niḥśreyasa).  It is accomplished by 
transformative practices that involve reflexive cultivation of self’s cognitive powers by 
philosophical and meditative analysis.78  Since, self’s reflexivity is mediated by its inner instrument, 
the mind (manas), practices of self-transformation involve cultivation of the attentional capacities 
of the mind.  Mind is the faculty, or more precisely the instrument, of attention (dhyāna) and 
introspection.  In this capacity, it is the means of cognitive development as the necessary causal link 
that allows the self to access its mental states and sensory deliverances and to know itself as a 
substance. 
 
Cultivation of attention is cultivation of attentional receptivity to objects.79   Attention (dhyāna) is 
synonymous with meditation, as concentrated receptive awareness of an object, which engenders a 
deeper awareness of the substantive character of the object and its distinct qualities and 
distinguishes it from the substantive and qualitative features of other objects.80  Cognitive 
development, via meditative attention promotes the analytic separation of materiality, mental 
objects, and the self.  Most significantly,  concentration of ‘mind’, or attention, centres on self-
substance as a means of gaining  direct experience of the self unmixed with material or mental 
objectivity of any sort.82  The essential requirement of such experience is the elimination of I-
making (ahaṃkāra), i.e. elimination of the identification of self with mental and physical objects 
and of mental and physical objects with the self.  The idea here is that by cultivation of its reflexive 
powers of self-knowledge by meditative attention, a self develops the ability to distinguish its own-
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nature (svarūpa) as self-substance and the own-nature of the constituents of the world, and the 
ontological relations which bind these, as a categorial order of things.83  
 
Cognition has moral and affective value here, so cognitive development as experiential knowledge 
of the self, and of the order of things more broadly, is associated with ethical and affective values.  
In fact, epistemic practice is ethical practice.  Thus, meditative concentration, which is an 
immersion in self-substance, is true cognition because it is an experience of the true being of the 
self distinct from other objects.  As such, it engenders virtue (dharma) and is a joyful experience 
because it is an experience of the good itself.  Erroneous, ordinary cognition, the epistemic mixing 
of self and matter, on the other hand, accrues non-virtue (adharma) and unhappiness.84  Self-
experience is thus not merely a cognitive end, a cognitive good, but equally an ethical and affective 
good as knowledge of that good which is itself, intrinsically, the highest virtue and happiness.85   
 
By generating virtuous powers (dharma), self-knowledge transforms the conative, desire-based 
structure of personal agency to one that is virtue-based and virtue-laden.  Ordinarily, mind, as the 
connecting link between self and body, is impelled by desire-motivated volitional impulses of the 
self in all forms of intentional and subintentional behaviour.  With the cognitive, ethical, and 
affective transformation of the self, however, virtuous powers (dharma) which ordinarily act 
indirectly as ethical-compositional powers (adṛṣṭa) come to have direct agentive force: they directly 
grasp and direct the mind in intentional and subintentional activities.  Action is now motivated by 
virtuous powers that derive from right knowledge, knowledge of the true nature (svarūpa, 
svabhāva) of things and the affections of joy, compassion, and so on, that accompany this, rather 
than conscious or unconscious desire-belief complexes.  The essence of virtue-motivated action is 
that it is non-appropriative epistemically.  Such action is informed by an understanding of the own-
nature, or own-being, of self and matter and so does not seek to conceptually own or appropriate 
mental and physical objects and events as me or mine.  This is a dualistic understanding that 
considers self-substance to be the pre-subjective and pre-objective ground of embodied subjectivity 
and the objectivity of the natural world, respectively – as we saw earlier.  It admits the metaphysical 
dependence of the objective differentiation of the outer world on the mental and ethical qualities of 
the self, what we might term its inner qualitative differentiation; and conversely, the dependence of 
the inner differentiation of self’s mental and ethical life on material objectivity.  It rests on a clear 
insight that what binds the realms of subjective and objective life is moral values and ethical 
structures qua adṛṣṭa and aims, therefore, at the ethical integrity of a life of non-appropriation and 
non-ownership of that which is not truly itself.  
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Conclusion 
Praśastapāda, we have seen, presents an innovative conception of the self as a reflexive being that is 
a value in and for itself.  This grounds a metaphysics of embodied existence in which self and world 
are infused with an ethics of the self, the possibility of which lies in a conception of ethics as 
metaphysics and epistemic practice as ethical and affective practice.  Regardless of the plausibility 
of some of its core assumptions, this metaphysics of self rests on the intuition that reason, values, 
and law have an ontological reality, and are primitively linked in ways that are constitutive of each, 
which guarantees their continuity between the rational domain of human agency and the impersonal 
causal order of the physical world.  The dualist thrust of this metaphysics, however, supports 
epistemic and ethical recognition of the true-being or own-nature of material and non-material 
things – rather than the appropritation of the natural world by human selves.  Two core assumptions 
are at work here: an ethics of non-appropriation; and a primitive interlocking of being, truth, and 
values or, we might say, of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, which invokes the metaphysical 
co-dependence of embodied selfhood and its world.  These twin themes permeate not just Vaiśeṣika 
but classical Indian philosophy more generally.  More significantly, they define and shape Indian 
philosophical practice historically, in its various conceptual guises, Brahmanical, Buddhist, and 
Jaina, from Vedic speculations to the Buddha and Gandhi. 
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